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Abstract
It is well known that an equilibrium in the Arrow-Debreu model may
fail to exist if a very restrictive condition called the survival assumption
is not satisfied. We study two approaches that allow for the relaxation of
this condition. Danilov and Sotskov (1990), and Florig (2001) developed a
concept of a generalized equilibrium based on a notion of hierarchic prices.
Marakulin (1990) proposed a concept of an equilibrium with non-standard
prices. In this paper, we establish the equivalence between non-standard
and hierarchic equilibria. Furthermore, we show that for any specified
system of dividends the set of such equilibria is generically finite. We also
provide a generic characterization of hierarchic equilibria and give an easy
proof of the core equivalence result.
Key words: competitive equilibrium, hierarchic price, non-standard analysis,
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1 Introduction
It is well known that an equilibrium in the Arrow-Debreu model may fail to exist
if a very restrictive condition called the survival assumption is not satisfied. Its
most widely used and widely criticized version requires every consumer to have
a positive initial endowment of every good existing in the economy.
To illustrate the problem consider an example (cf. Gale (1976)) of a market
with two traders and two commodities: apples and oranges. The first trader
∗The earlier version of this paper was published as a CentER Discussion Paper. Whilst
the basic results we report are the same in character (except for Theorem 6.1), a number of
inaccuracies and minor errors in the proofs have been corrected.
†Econometric Institute, Faculty of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, P.O. Box
1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands. E-mail: konovalov@few.eur.nl.
‡Institute of Mathematics, Russian Academy of Science, ac. Koptyug pr.4, Novosibirsk,
630090, Russia. E-mail: marakul@math.nsc.ru
1
owns apples and oranges, but has a positive utility only for apples, the second
trader cares for both, but owns only oranges. If the price of oranges is positive
then the first agent sells his oranges in order to buy more apples, but he already
has all the apples. If prices of oranges is zero then the second agent demands
an infinite amount of oranges. Thus, no equilibrium results. The reason for this
is that the second trader’s budget correspondence is not lower hemicontinuous.
As the price for oranges falls to zero, the budget set and the demand “explode”.
An idea that suggests itself is to redefine a budget correspondence by appropriate
refining the notion of prices in order to get an equilibrium that always exists. In
particular, an equilibrium in Gale’s example would be restored if one manages to
define prices for oranges so small that no apples can be bought for any amount
of oranges, but still non-zero.
Two realizations of this idea were proposed so far. Gay (1978), Danilov and
Sotskov (1990), Mertens (1996), and Florig (1998, 2001) developed an approach
based on a notion of a hierarchic price. At equilibrium, all commodities (or
commodity bundles treated as separate goods) are divided into several disjoint
classes and traded against commodities of the same class according to prices
which are an element of some set called a hierarchic price. Moreover, the set of
such classes is ordered, superior class commodities cost infinitely much compared
to the inferior class ones.
Marakulin (1990) uses non-standard prices in the sense of Robinson’s infinites-
imal analysis (Robinson (1966)). A similar hierarchic structure of submarkets
arises.
An idea to use non-standard numbers to measure prices may look odd at first
sight. But a second thought shows that it is not a much bigger abstraction than
the use of real numbers for this purpose. Hardly anyone ever paid to anyone
else a price of
√
2. Besides, non-standard prices are even natural, since they
reflect the fact that costs and values (which are no more than mere numbers)
are usually “more divisible” than quantities of consumption goods such as cars,
houses, pieces of clothing, etc. The only disadvantage of this approach seems to
be that there are still relatively few working economists trained in non-standard
analysis. On the other hand, it clearly exceeds standard ways in elegance of
proofs and generality of results.
This paper is a continuation of the study of generalized equilibria in a model
without the survival assumption. Its first contribution is the reconciliation of
standard and non-standard approaches. Starting with non-standard equilib-
rium, we derive a unique representation of non-standard prices by a hierarchic
price, which allows us to characterize non-standard budget sets in pure standard
terms. The equivalence between non-standard equilibria and Florig’s hierarchic
2
equilibria follows. By use of these results, we prove that it is the possible to
represent the set of all equilibrium hierarchic prices as a union of manifolds
of dimension less than the number of goods in an economy. This fact allows
us to show generic finiteness of hierarchic equilibria for any specified system
of dividends. We also provide an existence theorem for this class of equilibria
that generalizes the existence result of Marakulin (1990). Furthermore, we show
that the set of such equilibria is generically a subset of the union of competitive
equilibria and Dre`ze-Mu¨ller coupons equilibria. Finally, we give an easy proof of
the equivalence between non-standard (and, therefore, hierarchic) equilibria and
the fuzzy rejective core of an economy, a refinement of the weak core introduced
in Konovalov (1998).
Section 2 provides the reader with the definition of an equilibrium with non-
standard prices and an example which motivates the use of this concept. Sec-
tion 3 contains a number of auxiliary results that allow us to describe the set
of non-standard equilibria in pure standard terms and establish the equivalence
between non-standard and hierarchic equilibria. In Section 4 the structure of the
set of hierarchic equilibrium prices is investigated. In Section 5 we prove the ex-
istence of non-standard dividend equilibria for any specified system of dividends
and show the generic finiteness of such equilibria. In Section 6 a generic charac-
terization of non-standard dividend equilibria in terms of constrained equilibria
is given. Section 7 contains a core equivalence result.
2 Equilibrium with non-standard prices
We work with an exchange economy E defined by
L = {1, . . . , l} — the set of commodities;
Q ⊆ IRl — the set of admissible prices;
N = {1, . . . , n} — the set of agents, where each agent i ∈ N is characterized
by his consumption set Xi ⊂ IRl, initial endowments wi ∈ Xi, and preferences
given by a correspondence Pi : Xi → 2Xi , where Pi(xi) denotes the set of
consumption bundles strictly preferred to xi.
Denote the Cartesian product of individual consumption sets
∏
i∈N Xi by X
and let Bi(p) = {x ∈ Xi | px ≤ pwi} be the budget set of an agent i.
Definition 2.1
An allocation x¯ ∈ X is a Walrasian equilibrium if there exists p ∈ Q such that
the following conditions hold:
(i) attainability: x¯i ∈ Bi(p), i ∈ N,
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(ii) individual rationality: Pi(x¯i) ∩Bi(p) = ∅, i ∈ N,
(iii) market clearing:
∑
i∈N
x¯i =
∑
i∈N
wi.
Consider the ∗-image ∗Q of the set Q as the set of all admissible non-standard
prices and define by analogy with the standard case non-standard budget sets
of consumers:
∗Bi(p) = {x ∈ ∗Xi | px ≤ pwi}, p ∈ ∗Q, i ∈ N.
By definition, these sets consist of non-standard consumption plans. Consider
their standard parts B¯i(p) :
B¯i(p) = st ∗Bi(p) = {x ∈ Xi | ∃x˜ ∈ ∗Bi(p) : x˜ ≈ x},
where x˜ ≈ x denotes infinitesimality of the difference x˜ − x : ‖x˜ − x‖ ≈ 0. An
equilibrium with non-standard prices is formally defined by substitution of the
set of possible prices and budget sets in the notion of Walrasian equilibrium for
∗Q and B¯i(p), respectively.
Definition 2.2
An allocation x¯ ∈ X is an equilibrium with non-standard prices if there exists
p ∈ ∗Q such that the following conditions hold:
(i) attainability: x¯i ∈ B¯i(p), i ∈ N,
(ii) individual rationality: Pi(x¯i) ∩ B¯i(p) = ∅, i ∈ N,
(iii) market clearing:
∑
i∈N
x¯i =
∑
i∈N
wi.
It readily follows from the definition above that each Walrasian equilibrium is
also an equilibrium with non-standard prices.
Proposition 2.3
Suppose that x¯ is a Walrasian equilibrium and p¯ ∈ Q is a corresponding stan-
dard vector of equilibrium prices. Then x¯ is an equilibrium with non-standard
prices.
Proof. Take p¯ ∈ Q ⊂ ∗Q as a non-standard equilibrium price vector. Con-
sider an arbitrary individual i. The Walrasian budget set Bi(p¯) is by definition
a subset of B¯i(p¯) (since Xi ⊂ ∗Xi). To prove the proposition, we need to show
that B¯i(p¯) ⊆ Bi(p¯). Let x ∈ B¯i(p¯), then there exists x˜ ∈ ∗Bi(p¯) infinitely near
to x. Since Bi(p¯) is closed in Xi, x ∈ Bi(p¯) by the non-standard condition for
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closedness (see, for instance, Anderson (1991), Proposition 2.2.2). Therefore,
Bi(p¯) = B¯i(p¯) for every i, which implies that x¯ is a Walrasian equilibrium.
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Reversely, an equilibrium with non-standard prices p is a Walrasian equilibrium
if the survival condition is satisfied for each agent i at prices p¯ = ◦(p/‖p‖).
Recall that ◦a for a ∈ ∗IRl denotes a standard part of a, that is an element of
IRl such that ◦a ≈ a.
Proposition 2.4
Suppose that x¯ is a non-standard equilibrium with non-standard prices p ∈ ∗Q.
Let p¯ = ◦(p/‖p‖). If
inf p¯Xi < p¯wi, i ∈ N,
then B¯i(p) = Bi(p¯) for every i ∈ N, and x¯ is a Walrasian equilibrium sustained
by the price system p¯.
The proof of this fact is relegated to an appendix since it uses Proposition 3.1
that appears later in the paper.
Replacing (iii) in the Definition 2.2 by∑
i∈N
x¯i ≤
∑
i∈N
wi,
gives a definition of a semi-equilibrium with non-standard prices.
A satiation effect and dividends
Unfortunately, non-standard equilibria typically do not exist due to a satiation
effect caused by measuring prices in non-standard numbers. Recall that an
agent is said to be satiated if his demand does not belong to the boundary of
his budget set. If there is at least one such an agent in an economy, Walras’ law
is violated and no competitive equilibrium exists. In our model, even if agent i’s
preferences are locally non-satiated, his demand belongs to the boundary of the
standard set B¯i(p) but not necessarily to the boundary of the set ∗Bi(p), which
almost entirely consists of non-standard points. In other words, infinitesimal
budget excess may be created, which in its turn may result in non-standard
equilibrium existence failure.
The problem is alike the one caused by indivisibilities. Suppose that a smallest
available quantity of the good that I need is ε and its price is p1. If the amount
δ of free value at my disposal is less than p1ε, I can not use it to increase my
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utility. All the more, if δ is infinitesimal while p1 is not, no standard quantity
of such a good is achievable. In any case, the consequence of this infinitely
small value being unused is an inequality
∑
i∈N px¯
i <
∑
i∈N pw
i, where x¯i are
individual demands, which is inconsistent with the equilibrium market clearing
condition1.
Semi-equilibria with non-standard prices exist if all consumption sets are pos-
itive orthants (Marakulin (1990)). In a more general case, where Xi are con-
vex closed bounded from below sets, there exist dividend equilibria with non-
standard prices. A notion of dividend equilibrium was proposed by several
authors (Makarov (1981), Aumann and Dre`ze (1986), Mas-Colell (1992)) in or-
der to analyse economies which allowed for possibly satiated preferences. In a
dividend equilibrium, each agent i’s budget constraint is relaxed by some slack
variable di in order to allow for redistribution of a budget excess created by sa-
tiated agents among non-satiated ones. Such a slack variable can be interpreted
as an agent’s endowment of coupons (as in Dre`ze and Mu¨ller (1980)) or paper
money (as in Kajii (1996)).
For prices p ∈ ∗Q and a system of dividends d ∈ ∗IRn+ consider the sets
B¯i(p, di) = st {x ∈ ∗Xi | px ≤ pwi + di}, i ∈ N.
Definition 2.5
An allocation x¯ ∈ X is a non-standard dividend equilibrium, if there exist non-
standard vectors d = (d1, . . . , dn) ∈ ∗IRn+ and p ∈ ∗Q, such that the following
conditions hold:
(i) attainability: x¯i ∈ B¯i(p, di), i ∈ N,
(ii) individual rationality: Pi(x¯i) ∩ B¯i(p, di) = ∅, i ∈ N.
(iii) market clearing:
∑
i∈N
x¯i =
∑
i∈N
wi.
It is well-known that if agents’ preferences are locally non-satiated, then all
dividend terms at a dividend equilibrium have to be equal to zero, which makes
it an ordinary Walrasian equilibrium. Similarly, one can assert that if x¯ is a
non-standard dividend equilibrium and local non-satiation of preferences holds,
then every di is infinitesimal.
1See Florig (2000) and Florig and Rivera (2001) to find out more on the connection between
equilibrium in a model with indivisible goods and hierarchic equilibrium. In particular, it is
shown that a hierarchic equilibrium is a limit of dividend equilibria of an economy where
all commodities are assumed to be indivisible with a level of indivisibility going to zero.
Thus, a hierarchic equilibrium (and, therefore, a non-standard dividend equilibrium) can be
interpreted as a dividend equilibrium of an economy with small indivisibilities.
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Proposition 2.6
Suppose that x¯ is a non-standard dividend equilibrium such that an equilibrium
price vector p is near-standard. Assume that for every ε ∈ IR++, for all i ∈ N,
and every xi ∈ Xi there exists yi ∈ Pi(xi) such that ‖yi − xi‖ < ε. Then di ≈ 0
for every i ∈ N.
Proof. Consider the standard part ◦p of an equilibrium price vector p and
show that
◦px¯i = ◦pwi + ◦di, i ∈ N. (1)
The inequality ◦px¯i > ◦pwi + ◦di would imply that x¯i is not attainable for i.
Suppose that
◦px¯i < τ < ◦pwi + ◦di,
for some τ ∈ IR. Then there exists ε ∈ IR++ such that ◦pyi < τ < ◦pwi + ◦di
for every yi ∈ {zi ∈ Xi | ‖xi − zi‖ < ε}. By continuity of scalar multiplication,
py˜i < τ < pwi+di for every y˜i ≈ yi. Therefore, every element of some standard
neighborhood of x¯i is also an element of the budget set B¯i(p, di). By the local
non-satiation condition, the intersection B¯i(p, di)∩Pi(x¯i) is not empty, which is
a contradiction with x¯i being the maximal element on B¯i(p, di). Therefore (1) is
true. To complete the proof, one needs to observe that all ◦di have to be equal
to zero if (1) is to be consistent with the equilibrium market clearing condition.
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The need to use non-standard prices and dividends is illustrated by the following
example (cf. Florig (2001)). In this example not only Walrasian equilibria,
but also equilibria and semi-equilibria with non-standard prices fail to exist.
However, a non-standard dividend equilibrium exists.
Consider a market with two agents and two goods: white bread and brown
bread. Each agent requires a minimum of four slices of bread a day to survive
and has an initial endowment of three slices of white bread and one slice of brown
bread. The first consumer likes only white bread, and the second consumer likes
only brown bread. Formally, consumption sets and initial endowments of agents
are given by X1 = X2 = {x ∈ IR2+ : xW + xB ≥ 4}, w1 = w2 = (3, 1), agents’
preferences are represented by utility functions u1(x) = xW , u2(x) = xB .
An allocation x¯1 = (4, 0), x¯2 = (2, 2) looks especially attractive, in fact, it is
the only Pareto optimum. Nevertheless, it can not be obtained through the
market mechanism unless non-standard prices and dividends are employed. If
prices are different from (1, 1), then one of two agents demands more than 4
slices of bread, which would push the other agent outside of his consumption
set. Therefore, neither equilibrium nor semi-equilibrium is possible. If p = (1, 1)
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Figure 1: Non-existence of equilibria without non-standard prices and dividends.
then excess demand for brown bread is greater than zero, the same is true for
non-standard prices p = (1 + ε, 1 − ε), where ε is some positive infinitesimal.
For prices p = (1− ε, 1+ ε) the excess demand for white bread exceeds zero. By
Proposition 2.4, the case ◦p = (1, 1) is the only one where non-standard prices
matter. Thus, the set of Walrasian equilibria, as well as the sets of equilibria and
semi-equilibria with non-standard prices, are empty for this economy. However,
x¯ is a non-standard dividend equilibrium if prices are p = (1 − ε, 1 + ε) and
dividends are d = (0, 2ε).What is happening is that in addition to the standard
price system (1, 1), a commodity bundle (−1, 1) is priced by an infinitesimal
value, encouraging in such a way the sale of brown bread and the purchase of
white bread. One could say that infinitesimal prices and dividends determine an
additional constraint, which plays a role of a rationing scheme. Namely, suppose
that di represents an agent i’s endowment of coupons. Then the second agent
spends his amount of coupons 2ε buying one slice of brown bread and selling
one slice of white bread, and this is as much as he can achieve. The first agent
does not have to spend any coupons at all.
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3 Hierarchic prices and non-standard
budget sets
In this section we study non-standard prices and budget sets. Among the results
displayed are the representation of non-standard prices by an orthonormal set
of standard vectors and characterization of non-standard dividend budget sets
in pure standard terms. Throughout this section, we use simplified notations,
in what follows X ⊂ IRl denotes a consumption set of some individual. Without
loss of generality we assume that his initial endowments are zero (the general
situation can easily be reduced to this case by a shift of the consumption set).
In the beginning of the section we deal with the following budget sets
B(p) = {x ∈ X : px ≤ 0},
— a standard budget set for p ∈ IRl;
∗B(p) = {x ∈ ∗X : px ≤ 0},
— a non-standard budget set for p ∈ ∗IRl;
B¯(p) = st ∗B(p) = {x ∈ X : ∃ x˜ ∈ ∗X : x˜ ≈ x and px˜ ≤ 0},
— a standardization of a non-standard budget set.
An ordered orthonormal set {q1, . . . , qk} of non-zero vectors in IRl is called a
hierarchic price. The first proposition projects the set of non-zero non-standard
prices ∗IRl\{0} onto the set of all possible hierarchic prices ∪lk=1Vl,k, where Vl,k
is a Stiefel manifold.
Proposition 3.1
For each p ∈ ∗IRl\{0}, there exists an orthonormal set of standard vectors
{q1, q2, . . . , qk} ∈ IRlk such that p has a unique representation
p = λ1q1 + · · ·+ λkqk, (2)
with positive coefficients λj ∈ ∗IR++ satisfying
λj+1
λj
≈ 0, j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}. (3)
Proof. The proof of the proposition is by induction in the dimension l of the
space containing vector p ∈ ∗IRl. The proposition is trivially verified for l = 1.
Suppose that it is true for l ≤ m for some natural m and show that it holds for
l = m+ 1.
Assuming p 6= 0, let p′ = p/ ∗‖p‖. Since p′ is near-standard (due to compactness
of the unit ball in a finite dimensional space and the non-standard criterion of
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compactness), one may find q1 = ◦(p′) and λ1 = pq1. Let p′′ = p − λ1q1 and
consider a subspace L = {x ∈ IRl |xq1 = 0}. Note that by the Transfer Principle
(see Anderson (1991), p. 2158), ∗L has a similar structure as L :
∗L = {x ∈ ∗IRl | xq1 = 0}.
By the definition of p′′,
p′′q1 = (p, q1)− (p, q1)(q1, q1) = 0,
(since (q1, q1) = 1), which implies that p′′ ∈ ∗L. However, dim L ≤ l, hence,
by the induction agreement, there exists an orthonormal system of standard
vectors {q2, . . . , qk}, such that
p′′ = λ2q2 + · · ·+ λkqk,
where positive coefficients λ satisfy λj+1/λj ≈ 0, j = 2, . . . , k−1. Consequently,
p = λ1q1 + p′′ = λ1q1 + λ2q2 + · · ·+ λkqk.
It is clear that the system {q1, . . . , qk} is orthonormal. Let us show that λ2/λ1 ≈
0. To this end, put δ = ‖p′ − q1‖2 ≈ 0. Then
∗‖p′ − (p′, q1)q1‖2 = (p′, p′)− 2(p′, q1)2 + (p′, q1)2(q1, q1) =
= 1− (p′, q1)2 = 1− (1− δ2)
2 = δ(1− δ
4
),
which implies
∗‖p′′‖ = ∗‖p− λ1q1‖ = ∗‖p‖( ∗‖p′ − (p′, q1)q1‖) = ε ∗‖p‖,
where ε =
√
δ(1− δ4 ) ≈ 0. On the other hand,
∗‖p′′‖ = ∗‖p− λ1q1‖ = ∗‖λ2q2 + · · ·+ λkqk‖ =
√
λ22 + · · ·+ λ2kqk.
Taking into account (p′, q1) ≈ 1, one obtains
0 ≤ λ2
λ1
≤
√
λ22 + · · ·+ λ2k
λ1
=
∗‖p′′‖
λ1
=
ε ∗‖p‖
(p, q1)
=
ε
(p′, q1)
≈ 0.
Suppose now that λ1q1 + · · · + λkqk and λ′1q′1 + · · · + λsq′s are two different
representations of the same non-standard vector p. Then
0 =
k∑
j=1
λjqj −
s∑
j=1
λ′jq
′
j . (4)
Assume without loss of generality that s < k. Let λ1, for example, be the largest
element in the set {λ1, . . . , λk, λ′1, . . . , λ′s}. Since all λj , λ′j , j > 1 are infinitely
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smaller than λ1, it must be λ1q1 = λ′1q
′
1, which implies (recall ‖q1‖ = ‖q′1‖ =
1, λ1, λ′1 > 0) that λ1 = λ
′
1, q1 = q
′
1. Similarly, taking the largest element of
the set {λ2, . . . , λk, λ′2, . . . , λ′s} one will come to λ2 = λ′2, q2 = q′2, and so on,
until λs = λ′s, qs = q′s. But then (4) implies s = k.
2
Example: (1 + ε − ε2, ε − 2ε2,−ε2) = (1 + ε − ε2)(1, 0, 0) + (ε − 2ε2)(0, 1, 0) +
ε2(0, 0,−1).
If the relations (2)–(3) are true, we say that a hierarchic price (q1, . . . , qk)
represents a non-standard price vector p and denote it by qp. Conversely, if
q = (q1, . . . , qk) is a hierarchic price, one may consider for some ε ≈ 0, ε > 0 a
vector of non-standard prices
p(q, ε) = q1 + εq2 + · · ·+ εk−1qk
such that qp(q,ε) = q. Evidently, there is much more than one non-standard
vector that satisfies this property, in particular qp(q,ε) = qp(q,ε
2). Furthermore,
if p = 0, then put qp = {0}.
The next proposition gives a characterization of the set B¯(p) and is crucial for
our analysis. It asserts that if X is a polyhedral set then there is a number
m ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that the set B¯(p) consists of elements x such that the
vector (qjx)j=1,...,m is lexicographically less than zero.
Remind that a subset P ⊂ IRl is called a polyhedral set or a polyhedron if it is
the intersection of a finite number of closed half-spaces. Each polyhedral set is
closed and convex but not necessarily compact.
Denote the set {x ∈ X | q1x = 0, . . . , qmx = 0} by X(q1, . . . , qm) and put
X(∅) = X. Consider the sets
Bm(p) = {x ∈ X(q1, . . . , qm−1) | qmx ≤ 0}, m ≤ k, (5)
and
Bk+1(p) = X(q1, . . . , qk). (6)
Proposition 3.2
Suppose that p ∈ ∗IRl, and at least one of the following alternatives is true:
(a) The set X is a polyhedron;
(b) The set X is closed, star-shaped with respect to 0 and locally polyhedral at
0, that is for some small positive γ ∈ IR++ the set P = {x ∈ X : |xj | ≤
γ, j ∈ L} is a polyhedron.
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Then there exists a natural number m ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1} such that
B¯(p) = Bm(p).
Moreover, for m ≤ k there exists y ∈ B¯(p) such that qmy < 0.
The proof is based on the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3
Suppose that X ∈ IRl is a polyhedral set and p ∈ ∗IRl. Then pX ≥ 0 implies
p( ∗X) ≥ 0.
Note first that the conclusion of the lemma does not hold if X is not polyhedral.
Take for instance X = {x ∈ IR2+ |x2 ≥ (x1)2} and p = (−ε, 1), ε ≈ 0, ε > 0. Then
for each x ∈ X px = −εx1+ x2 ≥ 0. But once an element x˜ = (ε/2, ε2/4) ∈ ∗X
is taken, px˜ = −ε2/2 + ε2/4 < 0.
Proof. The set X consists of all vectors in IRl that satisfy some system of
linear inequalities:
X = {x ∈ IRl : dαx ≤ gα, α ∈ A},
where dα ∈ IRl\{0}, gα ∈ IR, and A is finite. It follows from the Fundamental
Theorem of Linear Inequalities (see, for example, Schrijver (1986), Theorem
7.16) that X can be represented as a sum of a compact polyhedron Y and a
convex cone Z with a finite number of generators. In other words, X = Y + Z,
and for some finite sets B ⊂ IRm, C ⊂ IRm
Y = conv B = {
∑
b∈B
βbb | βb ∈ IR+ &
∑
b∈B
βb = 1 },
and
Z = con C = {
∑
c∈C
γcc | γc ∈ IR+}.
Then by definition
pX ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ pb ≥ 0 & pc ≥ 0 ∀b ∈ B, ∀c ∈ C.
By the Transfer Principle, ∗X = ∗Y + ∗Z, where ∗Y and ∗Z are defined by
substitution IR+ for ∗IR+ in the definitions of Y and Z, respectively. Therefore,
pb ≥ 0 & pc ≥ 0 ∀b ∈ B, ∀c ∈ C ⇐⇒ p ( ∗X) ≥ 0.
2
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Corollary 3.4
Suppose that X ∈ IRl is star-shaped with respect to 0 and locally polyhedral at 0,
0 ∈ X and p ∈ ∗IRl. Then pX ≥ 0 implies p( ∗X) ≥ 0.
Proof. Let P be a polyhedron obtained as an intersection of X with a suffi-
ciently small closed cube, whose interior contains 0. Suppose that there exists
x˜ ∈ ∗X such that px˜ < 0. Then one can find x˜′ = εx˜ ∈ ∗P such that px˜′ < 0,
for some sufficiently small ε ∈ ∗IR++. But pP ≥ 0, which by Lemma 3.3 implies
p( ∗P ) ≥ 0, a contradiction.
2
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Let qp = (q1, . . . , qk) for some k ≤ l. If p = 0 then
q1 = 0, k = 1 and B¯(p) = X = B1(p). Suppose that there exist a number m ∈
{1, . . . , k} and an element y ∈ X(q1, . . . , qm−1) such that qmy < 0. Moreover,
assume that m is the smallest such a number, which guarantees that
qjX(q1, . . . , qj−1) ≥ 0, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}. (7)
Note that by construction y ∈ Bm(p). If m = 1 then B¯(p) = B(q1) = B1(p) by
virtue of Proposition 2.4. Assume m ∈ {2, . . . , k} and show that B¯(p) = Bm(p).
First, we shall prove that B¯(p) ⊆ Bm(p). Take some arbitrary x ∈ B¯(p) and
suppose that x 6∈ Bm(p). If so, then by the choice of m and the system of
inequalities (7) there exists a number j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that
qjx > 0, qtx = 0, t = 1, . . . , j − 1. (8)
Consider some arbitrary non-standard element x˜ ∈ ∗X such that x˜ ≈ x. Then
qjx > 0 implies that qj x˜ is greater than some strictly positive real number.
Take now any standard x′ ∈ X and consider the first non-zero element in the
ordered set {q1x′, . . . , qj−1x′}. Since j ≤ m, it follows again from (7) and the
choice of m that such an element, if it exists, is strictly positive. Therefore, a
non-standard linear functional λ1q1 + · · ·+ λj−1qj−1 takes only positive values
on X : (
λ1q1 + · · ·+ λj−1qj−1
)
X ≥ 0.
Then by Lemma 3.3 (
λ1q1 + · · ·+ λj−1qj−1
)
∗X ≥ 0. (9)
Consider
1
λj
px˜ =
1
λj
[λ1q1 + · · ·+ λj−1qj−1]x˜+ qj x˜+ 1
λj
[λj+1qj+1 + · · ·+ λkqk]x˜.
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The first component of the sum in the right-hand side is positive (it vanishes
if j = 1), the second component exceeds 0 by a non-infinitesimal amount and
the third component is infinitesimal. Therefore, (1/λj)px˜ is strictly positive, so
that px˜ > 0 for all x˜ ∈ ∗X such that x˜ ≈ x. This contradicts x ∈ B¯(p). We
have shown that B¯(p) ⊆ Bm(p).
Let x ∈ Bm(p), y ∈ X(q1, . . . , qm−1), qmy < 0. Consider a sequence
xn =
1
n
y + (1− 1
n
)x.
By convexity, xn ∈ ∗X for any n ∈ ∗IN. Moreover, pxn < 0 for all n ∈ IN. Show
that pxn˜ < 0 for some hyperfinite n˜. Suppose that the set
A = {n ∈ ∗IN : pxn ≥ 0}
is non-empty. This set is internal as a definable subset of an internal set ∗IN
(cf. Davis (1977), Theorem 1-8.1). Therefore it has a least element ν ∈ ∗IN\IN.
Take n˜ = ν − 1, then xn˜ ≈ x and pxn˜ < 0, which proves that x ∈ B¯(p).
To complete the proof it suffices to show that
∀m ∈ {1, . . . , k} qmX(q1, . . . , qm−1) ≥ 0
implies B¯(p) = Bk+1(p). If x ∈ Bk+1(p) then px = 0, so x ∈ B¯(p). The proof of
the inclusion B¯(p) ⊆ Bk+1(p) goes along the same lines as in the case m ≤ k.
2
Next, we turn our attention to the characterization of non-standard dividend
budget sets. For γ ∈ ∗IR++ and p ∈ ∗IRl consider the set
∗B(p, γ) = {x ∈ ∗X : px ≤ γ}
and denote by B¯(p, γ) its standardization:
B¯(p, γ) = st ∗B(p, γ).
The following auxiliary lemma is useful. It says that small changes in prices
and dividends do not alter a standardized dividend budget set.
Lemma 3.5
Let X be a closed convex set, 0 ∈ X. Suppose that p, p′ ∈ ∗IRl and that the
non-standard numbers γ > 0, γ′ > 0 satisfy
|p− p′| / γ ≈ 0 and γ/γ′ ≈ 1,
then B¯(p, γ) = B¯(p′, γ′).
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Proof. Show first that B¯(p, γ) = B¯(p, γ′). To this end assume γ′ > γ and
show that the inclusion
B¯(p, γ′) ⊆ B¯(p, γ) (10)
holds. Let x ∈ B¯(p, γ′). Then one can find x˜ ≈ x, x˜ ∈ ∗X such that px˜ ≤ γ′.
Suppose that px˜ > γ (otherwise there is nothing to prove), and consider y =
(1− ε)x˜ where ε ≈ 0 satisfies γ′ = (1 + ε)γ. It is clear that y ≈ x˜ ≈ x, y ∈ ∗X
by convexity, and
py = px˜− εpx˜ ≤ γ′ − εγ = γ.
Thus inclusion (10) follows.
Next we shall establish
B¯(p, γ′) = B¯(p′, γ′).
Let p′′ = p− p′. Since |p′′| / γ′ ≈ 0, one can find ε ≈ 0, ε > 0 such that
|p′′| / εγ′ ≈ 0.
Then for every near-standard y ∈ ∗X
p′y − εγ′ ≤ py ≤ p′y + εγ′.
Therefore py ≤ γ′ implies p′y ≤ γ′ + εγ′ and
B¯(p, γ′) ⊆ B¯(p′, γ′ + εγ′) = B¯(p′, γ′).
Similarly, B¯(p′, γ′) ⊆ B¯(p, γ′).
2
Using representation (2) for p ∈ ∗IRl, assign to each non-standard γ > 0 its
infinitesimality level, that is a number j = j(p, γ) ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1} such that
j(p, γ) =
{
min {m | γ/λm 6≈ 0}, if γ/λk 6≈ 0,
k + 1 otherwise.
For j ≤ k, denote by µ = µ(p, γ) a standard part of the ratio γ/λj :
µ(p, γ) = ◦(γ/λj).
Thus µ is an element of IR++ ∪ {+∞}. Put µ = +∞ if j = k + 1.
The next statement gives a complete characterization of a non-standard dividend
budget set for a polyhedral set X.
Proposition 3.6
Let X be polyhedral, p ∈ ∗IRl, γ ∈ ∗IR++. Assume that 0 ∈ X. Then one of the
following alternatives is true:
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(i) B¯(p, γ) = X(q1, . . . , qj−1) and µ = +∞;
(ii) B¯(p, γ) = {x ∈ X(q1, . . . , qj−1) | qjx ≤ µ} and µ < +∞;
(iii) B¯(p, γ) = Bm(p) for some m < j and there exists y ∈ B¯(p, γ) such that
qmy < 0.
Here q = (q1, . . . , qk) is a hierarchic price representing p, j = j(p, γ) is the
infinitesimality level of γ.
Proof. Consider an (l+1)-dimensional set X∗ = X×{1}, and a “budget” set
{x ∈ ∗X∗|p∗x ≤ 0}, (11)
where the price vector p∗ ∈ IRl+1 is given by
p∗ =

(p′,−γ), if γ/λj ≈ +∞, p′ = p−
∑
t≥j
λtqt,
(p′,−λjµ), if γ/λj < +∞, p′ =
∑
t≤j
λtqt.
By construction |p− p′|/γ ≈ 0 and λjµ/γ ≈ 1. Since 0 ∈ X, Lemma 3.5 implies
that the projection of the standardization of the set defined in (11) onto the
first l components of the set X∗ coincides with B¯(p, γ). At the same time,
p∗ =
∑
t<j
λtq
∗
t + λ
∗
jq
∗
j ,
where q∗t = (qt, 0) if t < j,
q∗j =
{
(0,−1), if γ/λj ≈ +∞,
(qj ,−µ), if γ/λj < +∞,
and
λ∗j =
{
γ, if γ/λj ≈ +∞,
λj , if γ/λj < +∞.
Since a hierarchic price {q∗t }t≤j represents p∗ (strictly speaking, the vector q∗j
should be normalized), Proposition 3.2 is applicable. The alternatives (i)− (iii)
follow immediately. The case m < j corresponds to alternative (iii). If m = j
and γ/λj < +∞, then µ < +∞, and the budget restriction in the definition of
Bm(p∗) has the form (
(x, 1), (qj ,−µ)
)
≤ 0⇒ qjx ≤ µ,
so alternative (ii) follows. If m = j and γ/λj ≈ +∞, then alternative (i) is true.
The case m = j + 1 will not occur because the assumption 0 ∈ X guarantees
that 0 ∈ B¯(p, γ).
2
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This proposition makes it a mere formality to show that non-standard dividend
equilibria coincide with Florig’s hierarchic equilibria. One only needs to observe
that non-standard prices and dividends on the one hand, and hierarchic prices
and revenues on the other, provide an individual with the same budget oppor-
tunities. Consider a hierarchic price q = (q1, . . . , qk) and define the q-value of a
consumption bundle x as a vector
qx = (q1x, . . . , qkx,+∞, . . . ,+∞) ∈ (IR ∪ {+∞})l.
A hierarchic revenue r is an element of (IR ∪ {+∞})l. For a hierarchic price q,
revenue r and i ∈ N consider
si(q, r) = min {s ∈ {1, . . . , l}|∃x ∈ Xi : (q1x, . . . , qsx) ≺ (r1, . . . , rs)},
where ≺ denotes a lexicographic ordering. In principle, si is the first level
at which a consumer i is not at minimum wealth. Given si(q, r), consider an
augmented revenue vector
ρi(q, r) = (r1, . . . , rsi(q,r),+∞, . . . ,+∞) ∈ (IR ∪ {+∞})l
and the budget set of consumer i
Bi(q, r) = {x ∈ Xi | qx ¹ ρi(q, r)}.
This construction guarantees closedness of the budget set Bi(q, r).
Definition 3.7
A list of net trades x ∈∏i∈N (Xi−wi) is a hierarchic equilibrium of the economy
E if there exist a hierarchic price q and positive hierarchic revenues ri ∈ IRl+,
i ∈ N such that:
(i) xi ∈ Bi(q, ri) and Pi(x) ∩Bi(q, ri) = ∅, i ∈ N ;
(ii)
∑
i∈N x
i = 0.
Theorem 3.8
Suppose that consumption sets Xi of all individuals are polyhedral. Then the set
of hierarchic equilibria of an economy E coincides with the set of non-standard
dividend equilibria.
Proof. Suppose that x is a hierarchic equilibrium, and that q and r are the
corresponding hierarchic price and revenue, respectively. Then each consumer
maximizes his preferences on the set
Bi(q, ri) = {x ∈ Xi(q1, . . . , qsi−1) | qsix ≤ rsi},
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which immediately implies that x is a non-standard dividend equilibrium at
prices p = q1 + εq2 + · · · εk−1qk for some ε > 0, ε ≈ 0, and dividends
di = εsi−1rsi , i ∈ N.
Conversely, if x is a non-standard dividend equilibrium at p ∈ ∗IRl and d ∈ ∗IRn+,
then the representation qp will be a hierarchic equilibrium price, and for each
i ∈ N the components of a hierarchic equilibrium revenue ri will be
rit =
 0 if t < j(p, di)◦(di/λj(p,di)) if t = j(p, di)+∞ if t > j(p, di).
2
Propositions 3.2 and 3.6 allow us to set a useful relation between the standard-
ization of the non-standard budget set ∗B(p, γ) and its standard part, i.e. the
set of all standard elements satisfying the constraint px ≤ γ :
◦B(p, γ) = {x ∈ X : px ≤ γ}
Proposition 3.9
If X is a compact polyhedral set, 0 ∈ X, p ∈ ∗IRl, and γ ∈ ∗IR+, then
B¯(p, γ) = cl ◦B(p, γ). (12)
Proof. Since ◦B(p, γ) ⊆ B¯(p, γ) and since the latter set is closed, the claim
is proved if for an arbitrary x ∈ B¯(p, γ) we point out a standard sequence
(xα)α∈IN ⊂ X converging to x such that
pxα ≤ γ (13)
for every α ∈ IN.
Suppose that B¯(p, γ) = Bm(p) for somem < k+1. Then there exists y ∈ B¯(p, γ)
such that qmy < 0. We can choose for xα a convex combination
xα = (1/α)y + (1− 1/α)x, α ∈ IN.
Actually, since
pxα = (1/α)λmqmy + (1− 1/α)λmqmx+ λm+1[. . .] < 0,
where the value in the square brackets is near-standard (recall that x and y are
near-standard), it is easy to see that (13) holds for every γ ∈ IR+.
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If the alternative (ii) of Proposition 3.6 is true, we can put
xα = (1− 1/α)x, α ∈ IN.
All other cases do not require special inspection because for every x ∈ B¯(p, γ)
we have px ≤ γ, so it is possible to put xα = x.
2
In general, the relation (12) does not hold if X is not a polyhedron (a counter-
example is given in Marakulin (2001), page 84).
4 Manifolds of hierarchic prices
As was mentioned before, a hierarchic price q = (q1, . . . , qk) is, by definition, an
element of a Stiefel manifold Vl,k, which is a surface of dimension kl−k(k+1)/2
(see Dubrovin et al. (1985)). This is intuitively clear, as q is parametrized by
kl coordinates (qmt)
t=1,...,l
m=1,...,k related by k(k + 1)/2 equations:
∑
t=1,...,l
qmtqm′t =
{
1, if m = m′,
0, if m 6= m′.
The set of all possible hierarchic prices Θ is then a union of k Stiefel manifolds
and a set containing a zero vector:
Θ = (
l⋃
k=1
Vl,k) ∪ {0},
where components of Θ of the highest dimension are Vl,l and Vl,l−1,
dim Vl,l = dim Vl,l−1 = l(l − 1)/2.
In this section we prove that if all consumption sets in an economy are polyhe-
dral, then the set of all relevant hierarchic equilibrium prices Θ¯ can be described
as a finite union of manifolds whose dimension does not exceed l− 1. The term
“relevant” means here that for each non-standard dividend equilibrium one can
choose a hierarchic equilibrium price from Θ¯. Thus, the situation is similar to
what we have in the purely standard case, where a price vector belongs to a
sphere or an (l− 1)-simplex in IRl. This is surprising, since it means that intro-
ducing non-standard or hierarchic prices does not change the dimension of the
set of all possible equilibrium prices.
Besides, it means that if a non-standard equilibrium is described as a solution
of a system of equations ψ(q) = 0, one can use an (l − 1)-dimensional set as
the domain of the correspondence ψ. This will be useful, when we study generic
properties of the set of non-standard equilibria.
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Theorem 4.1
Suppose that Xi is a polyhedral set for every i ∈ N. Then there exists a set
Θ¯ ⊂ Θ such that
(i) for each non-standard dividend equilibrium x¯ there exists q ∈ Θ¯ such that
q is an equilibrium hierarchic price for x¯ (or, which is equivalent, such
that q represents non-standard equilibrium prices p corresponding to the
equilibrium x¯).
(ii) Θ¯ is a union of manifolds of dimension less than or equal to l − 1.
Proof. We continue to use the convention wi = 0 for every i ∈ N. Suppose
that x¯ is a non-standard dividend equilibrium and p ∈ ∗IRl and d ∈ ∗IRn+
are corresponding prices and dividends. It is possible to classify consumers
according to the structure of their budget sets B¯(p, di). Proposition 3.6 implies
that each consumer i faces (for some m = m(i) ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1}) m− 1 budget
constraints in the form of the equalities:
qtx = 0, t ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1},
and (possibly) one budget constraint in the form of the inequality: qmx ≤ 0 or
qmx ≤ µj , where µi = ◦(di/λj(p,di)). Let Nm ⊆ N be the set of all agents for
whom the last budget restriction involves the vector qm. For all such agents we
have
B¯i(p−
∑
t>m
λtqt, di) = B¯i(p, di).
Put i ∈ N1 if agent i faces no restrictions at all, that is if B¯i(p, di) = Xi. Thus,
given non-standard prices p and dividends di we partition the set of agents N
into k subsets N1, . . . , Nk.
Consider an arbitrary agent i; i ∈ Nm for some m. His budget set is a subset of
the set
Xi(q1, . . . , qm−1) = {x ∈ Xi | q1x = 0, . . . , qm−1x = 0}.
Each vector qt, t = 1, . . . ,m− 1, supports Xi(q1, . . . , qt−1), (though it does not
have to support Xi), which implies that the sets
Xi ⊃ Xi(q1) ⊃ . . . ⊃ Xi(q1, . . . , qm−1)
form a finite sequence of faces of Xi contained in each other. Denote the face
Xi(q1, . . . , qt−1) by F ti (p) (note that the superscript t specifies that there are
t− 1 equalities).
Let us construct a set Θp which contains a hierarchic price qp = (q1, . . . , qk)
representing p. It will be done in k steps, and Θp will finally be obtained as a
product of k spheres in some linear space.
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Consider the set Nk. Without loss of generality it is not empty (otherwise one
can throw away the last component of qp and consider a new equilibrium price
p′ = p− λkqk). Let Lk be the linear hull of faces F ki , i ∈ Nk,
Lk = span
( ⋃
i∈Nk
F ki (p)
)
.
It is clear that the vector qk must belong to this subspace (if necessary, qk can
be replaced by its projection on Lk). Take the unit sphere Sk in Lk as the last
component of Θp,
Sk = {x ∈ Lk | ‖x‖ = 1}.
Secondly, consider F k−1i (p) — superfaces of F
k
i (p) for i ∈ Nk — that is the sets
{x ∈ Xi | qtx = 0, t ≤ k − 2},
and faces F k−1i (p) for i ∈ Nk−1. Taking a linear hull of the union of the sets
F k−1i (p) for all i from Nk and Nk−1, we obtain a linear spaceMk−1 that contains
Lk. Denote by Lk−1 the orthogonal complement to Lk in the space Mk−1,
Lk−1 =Mk−1 ∩ (Lk)⊥,
and take the unit sphere in Lk−1 as the next component of Θp,
Sk−1 = {x ∈ Lk−1 | ‖x‖ = 1}.
(Note that since the vectors qt are mutually orthonormal, the vector qk−1 always
has a non-zero projection on Lk−1).
The procedure described above is reiterated k − 1 times. As a result, a system
of mutually orthogonal subspaces L1, . . . , Lk is constructed, where
Lm =Mm ∩ (Lm+1)⊥,
Mm = span
( ⋃
i∈Nt,t≥m
Fmi (p)
)
.
By construction, M1 = IRl, M1 = L1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Lk. The set Θp is defined as the
product of spheres in Lm, m = 1, . . . , k,
Θp = S1 × · · · × Sk,
so its dimension is equal to l − k.
Look now at the set
Υ = {Θp | p ∈ ∗IRl is an equilibrium price of an economy E}.
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This set is finite because each Xi has only a finite number of faces. Finally, let
Θ¯ =
⋃
Θp∈Υ
Θp.
By construction, for every non-standard dividend equilibrium x¯ there exists a
corresponding non-standard equilibrium price vector p, such that its hierarchic
representation qp belongs to Θ¯.
2
5 Existence and finiteness of non-standard equi-
libria
Gerard Debreu (1970), one of the founders of equilibrium analysis, was the
first to establish the finiteness of equilibria for “almost all” exchange econo-
mies. His approach was based on a variation of initial endowments while all
other parameters of the model were fixed. Using Sard’s theorem applied to
the aggregate excess demand function, Debreu obtained finiteness of equilibria
for an open set containing almost all – in the sense of Lebesgue measure –
allocations of initial resources. In subsequent contributions to the issue, Smale
(1974), Dubey (1980) and others used also variations of utility functions, which
required the use of Thom’s theorems of openness and density of transversal
intersections.
In the present paper we follow the latter approach, i.e., only utility functions
vary, while initial endowments are kept fixed. This is done because of the
fact that for almost all initial allocations of resources, the survival condition is
satisfied, in which case non-standard equilibria coincide with usual Walrasian
equilibria. Their local uniqueness follow then by the Debreu’s (1970) theorem.
In this section, we assume that preferences of agents are given by utility func-
tions defined over the set X =
∏
i∈N Xi
ui :
∏
i∈N
Xi → IR, i ∈ N.
However, the existence result of this section can easily be generalized to the case
of non-complete and non-transitive preferences. We introduce a new concept of
non-standard dividend equilibrium similar to the one given in Marakulin (1990)
but with a specified system of dividends. If the survival assumption is satisfied
in the model, then this concept boils down to a notion of equilibrium with
individual slacks proposed by Kajii (1996).
Fix a standard strictly positive vector δ ∈ IRn++. For a given non-standard
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number ε ∈ ∗IR+ consider the dividend budget sets
B¯i(p, εδi) = st {x ∈ Xi | px ≤ pwi + εδi}, i ∈ N.
Definition 5.1
An allocation x¯ is a δ-equilibrium of an economy E , if there exist ε ∈ ∗IR+ and
p ∈ ∗Q such that the following conditions hold:
(i) attainability:
x¯i ∈ B¯i(p, εδi), i ∈ N,
(ii) individual rationality:
ui(x¯) = max
xi∈B¯i(p,εδi)
ui(x¯|xi), i ∈ N,
(iii) market clearing: ∑
i∈N
x¯i =
∑
i∈N
wi.
The specifics of δ-equilibria are twofold. First, the ratio of individual dividends
is assumed to be given a priori and fixed, as in the case of Kajii’s equilib-
ria with individual slacks, or, for instance, Mas-Colell’s (1992) equilibria with
slack, where the uniform dividend scheme was applied. Second, dividends of
all consumers have the same “order of smallness” ε. Therefore, income is re-
distributed at most at one infinitesimality level, which may not generally be
the case for non-standard dividend equilibria. Interpretation of the components
δi depends on the further specification of the model. For instance, they may
represent initial stocks of coupons or paper money or express market shares of
individuals.
We continue with an example which illustrates that the system of dividends
has to be specific for the number of non-standard equilibria to be finite. Let
X1 = X2 = X3 = {(x1, x2) : 0 ≤ xj ≤ 10, j = 1, 2}, Q = {p ∈ IRl : ‖p‖ ≤
2}, w1 = (2, 1), w2 = w3 = (2, 0), u1(x) = 5 − (x1 − 1)2 − (x2 − 2)2, u2(x) =
u3(x) = x1. Allocations x¯1 = (1, 1), x¯2 = (2 + λ, 0), x¯3 = (3− λ, 0), 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1
constitute a continuum of non-standard dividend equilibria for p = (ε, 1), ε ≈ 0,
ε > 0, and dividends d = (0, λε, (1 − λ)ε). This example is robust against
sufficiently small perturbations of utility functions. Observe that if variations of
initial endowments are considered, then the number of non-standard equilibria
is generically finite. Indeed, the survival assumption (wi À 0, i = 1, 2, 3) is
satisfied for almost all perturbations of initial endowments, in which case non-
standard dividend equilibria coincide with ordinary Walrasian equilibria (see
Proposition 2.4).
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Figure 2: Continuum of non-standard dividend equilibria.
Next, we will show that δ-equilibria exist even if the survival condition or any of
its analogues is not satisfied. Note that the existence of non-standard dividend
equilibria unlike that of hierarchic equilibria (see Florig (2001)) does not re-
quire any conditions on consumption sets aside from convexity and compactness.
Moreover, the compactness assumption can always be relaxed and substituted
for closedness and boundedness from below.
Theorem 5.2
Let Q = {p ∈ IRl : ‖p‖ ≤ 1}. Assume that the set Xi is convex and compact,
and the utility function ui is continuous in x and strictly quasi-concave in xi
for every i ∈ N. Then for each δ ∈ IRn++ a δ-equilibrium exists.
The idea of the proof is to change slightly (in fact, by an infinitesimal value)
agents’ income functions pwi to make them meet the strong survival assumption,
and apply a non-standard translation of the standard existence theorem. Kajii’s
(1996) theorem is appropriate for this purpose. An equilibrium allocation is
found as a standard part of a non-standard equilibrium allocation obtained in
such a way.
Proof. Let us take an arbitrary standard strictly positive γ > 0 and extend
the economy with a new consumer 0 having a consumption set
X0 = {x ∈ IRl | ‖x‖ ≤ γ},
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initial endowments w0 = 0, and utility function u0 = 0. Revise income functions
of individuals: instead of pwi, consider functions
α0(p) = −γ‖p‖/2,
αi(p) = pwi +
γδi‖p‖
2
∑
j∈N δj
, i ∈ N,
as new incomes. At each non-zero prices some amount of value is taken from
consumer 0 and redistributed among other agents in proportions given by δ. Put
N0 = N ∪ {0}. We have obtained an exchange economy with n + 1 consumers
and generalized income functions
Eγ = < N0, {Xi, ui, αi, wi}i∈N0 , Q > .
The functions αi are continuous, satisfy Walras law:
n∑
i=0
αi(p) = −γ‖p‖2 + p
∑
i∈N
wi +
γ‖p‖∑i∈N δi
2
∑
j∈N δi
= p
∑
i∈N
wi,
and satisfy the strong survival assumption: for each non-zero p ∈ Q
α0(p) = −γ‖p‖/2 > −γ‖p‖ = inf pX0,
αi(p) > pwi ≥ inf pXi, i ∈ N.
By Corollary 1 in Kajii (1996), for each γ > 0 there exists some εγ ≥ 0, a pair
(x0γ , xγ) ∈ X0 ×X, and a price vector pγ ∈ Q such that each xiγ maximizes ui
on the set
Bi(pγ , αi, εγδi) = {x ∈ Xi | pγx ≤ αi(pγ) + εγδi},
and total demand is equal to total supply:
x0γ +
∑
i∈N
xiγ =
∑
i∈N
wi.
Choose any strictly positive infinitesimal γ ∈ ∗IR++. By the Transfer Principle,
we can find ε˜ ∈ ∗IR+, an allocation (x˜0, x˜) ∈ ∗X0× ∗X and prices p˜ ∈ ∗Q such
that each x˜i maximizes ui on the set
∗Bi(p˜, αi, ε˜δi) = {x ∈ ∗Xi | p˜x ≤ αi(p˜) + ε˜δi},
and
x˜0 +
∑
i∈N
x˜i =
∑
i∈N
wi. (14)
Since x˜ belongs to ∗X and X is a compact set, x˜ is near-standard. Let x¯ = ◦x˜
be a standard part of x˜.We shall prove that x¯ is a δ-equilibrium provided prices
are p˜ and
ε = ε˜+
γ‖p˜‖
2
∑
i∈N δi
.
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Taking standard parts from both sides of (14), one easily gets market clearing:∑
i∈N
x¯i =
∑
i∈N
wi.
Moreover, for each i
x¯i ∈ B¯i(p˜, εδi) = st {x ∈ ∗Xi | p˜x ≤ p˜wi + εδi}.
To complete the proof, we need to show that x¯i maximizes ui on the set B¯i(p˜, εδi)
given that x˜i is a utility maximum on the set
∗Bi(p˜, εδi) = {x ∈ ∗Xi | p˜x ≤ p˜wi + εδi}.
Suppose that for some i ∈ N it does not hold. Then there exists a standard
y ∈ B¯i(p˜, εδi) such that ui(y) > ui(x¯i). By the definition of the set B¯i(p˜, εδi)
there exists y′ ∈ ∗B(p˜, εδi) such that y′ ≈ y. By continuity of the utility function
ui,
ui(y′) > ui(x′)
for any x′ ≈ x¯i. Therefore, ui(y′) > ui(x˜i), a contradiction with x˜i being the
best element on the set ∗Bi(p˜, εδi).
2
Obviously, the existence of δ-equilibria implies the existence of non-standard
dividend equilibria. Thus we have the existence theorem of Marakulin (1990)
as a corollary of Theorem 5.2.
Furthermore, we will focus our attention on a specific class of δ-equilibria, for
which there exists at least one agent who consumes an element of the interior
of his consumption set.
Definition 5.3
A δ-equilibrium x¯ is proper if there exists i0 ∈ N such that x¯i0 ∈ int Xi0 .
In the rest of the section, we hold Xi and wi fixed for every i ∈ N. The finiteness
result is established under the following assumptions:
A1. For all i ∈ N the set Xi is a bounded from below polyhedron with a
non-empty interior.
A2. Utility functions ui are defined and twice differentiable on an open neigh-
bourhood X˜ of the set X.
Denote by U the linear space C2(X˜, IRn) and endow it with the standard topol-
ogy of C2 uniform convergence on compacts: if {ft}∞t=1 ⊂ C2(X˜, IRn), then
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ft → f0 ∈ C2(X˜, IRn) if and only if ft |K→ f0 if t → ∞ in the norm ‖ ‖C2 of
the vector space C2(K, IRn) for every compact set K ⊂ X˜. The norm ‖ ‖C2 is
defined by
‖g‖C2(K,IRn) = max{‖gi‖C(K,IRn), ‖ ∂gi∂xj ‖C(K,IRn),
‖ ∂2gi∂xj∂xs ‖C(K,IRn), i ∈ N, j, s ∈ N × L},
where
‖g‖C(K,IRn) = max{|g(x)| : x ∈ K}.
Thus we can think of an economy as of given by an element u of the set U.
Recall that a subset of a topological space is called residual if it is the countable
intersection of open dense sets. In particular, the Baire Category Theorem
asserts that a residual subset of a complete metric space is dense. The main
result of this section is the following theorem.
Theorem 5.4
For any strictly positive vector δ, there exists a residual (of the second category
and hence dense) set G ⊆ U such that for each u ∈ G the set of proper δ-
equilibria is finite.
The proof is rather cumbersome and will be organized into a number of steps.
We give now a brief guide how the finiteness of δ-equilibria will be obtained.
First we consider the set of equilibrium hierarchic prices ΘF that correspond to
δ-equilibria from the relative interior of an arbitrary face F of the polyhedron X.
After that, we construct a mapping Ψu, u ∈ U, which is defined on ri F×ΘF and
takes its values in some finite-dimensional space. This mapping characterizes
δ-equilibria from ri F. Then, in the range of Ψu, we find a manifold ∆F such
that Ψ−1u (∆F ) contains all δ-equilibria from ri F. Thus, to establish finiteness
of δ-equilibria, it is sufficient to show that the manifold Ψ−1u (∆F ) has dimension
zero (is discrete). We show that it is indeed so if Ψu is transversal to ∆F . Finally,
it follows by Thom’s theorems of density and openness of transversal sections
that the mapping Ψu is transversal to ∆F for a residual set of economies u ∈ U.
In our argument we heavily rely on Proposition 3.1 that gives a representation
of a non-standard price vector by a hierarchic price and Proposition 3.6 that
provides us with the characterization of non-standard dividend budget sets.
When using Proposition 3.6 to characterize δ-equilibria, one should remember
that all dividend terms εδi have the same infinitesimality level j(p, εδi) = j(p, ε).
Moreover, it follows from Lemma 3.5 that all components qs of an equilibrium
hierarchic price with s higher than j do not matter. Hence, we can assume
without loss of generality that for any hierarchic representation q = {q1, . . . , qk}
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of non-standard equilibrium prices p
k = j(p, ε) and ε/λk < +∞.
The case ε/λk ≈ +∞ is not interesting, since it can be reduced to the prices
p′ =
∑
j<k
λtqt for which ε/λj−1 ≈ 0.
Proposition 3.6 implies that each agent i faces m− 1 budget restrictions in the
form of equalities:
qtx = qtwi, t < m, x ∈ Xi, (15)
and one restriction in the form of inequality
qmx ≤ qmwi, x ∈ Xi,
for some natural number m < k. Moreover, there always exists y ∈ Xi for which
the last inequality is strict. For m = k the last restriction transforms to
qkx ≤ qkwi + δiµ, µ = ◦(ε/λk) (16)
and can be realized as an equality if µ = 0. Equations (15) determine a face
Fmi (p) of the polyhedron Xi such that w
i ∈ Fmi (p). In other words,
B¯i(p, εδi) = {x ∈ Fmi (p) | qmx ≤ qmwi} (17)
for m < k, and
B¯i(p, εδi) = {x ∈ F ki (p) | qkx ≤ qkwi + δiµ} (18)
otherwise.
From now on we again use the convention wi = 0, i ∈ N in order to facilitate
notations. Consider a partition N (p) = {N1, . . . , Nk} of the set N such that
each set Nm contains the agents, whose last budget restriction involves qm.
Fix some face F ⊆ X and consider a δ-equilibrium x that belongs to ri F —
the relative interior of F. Let p be the corresponding non-standard equilibrium
price vector. It is easy to see that
ri Fi ⊆ Fmi (p), i ∈ N,
where Fi are faces of Xi that compose the face F :
F =
∏
i∈N
Fi.
Faces Fmi (p) ⊆ Xi are determined by prices p and equalities (15) for the appro-
priate m ≤ k. The definition of a δ-equilibrium implies that each xi maximizes
utility ui(.) on the set
{x ∈ ri Fi | qmx ≤ 0}
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if m < k, i ∈ Nm and on the set
{x ∈ ri Fi | qkx ≤ δiµ}
if i ∈ Nk.
Let ΘF be the set that contains all hierarchic equilibrium prices that correspond
to δ-equilibria from F. The construction used in the proof of Theorem 4.1 implies
that this set can be represented as a finite union of manifolds ΘξF such that for
each ΘξF there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , l} such that
ΘξF =
k∏
m=1
(Lξm\{0}),
where Lξ1, . . . , L
ξ
k are mutually orthogonal subspaces of IR
l. From now on, we fix
an arbitrary element Θ of this finite union and denote by Θm its components
Lm\{0}, m = 1, . . . , k,
Θ = Θ1 × · · · ×Θk.
We proceed with introducing a mapping Ψu that characterizes δ-equilibria from
the face F . This mapping will be constructed as a product of the following
correspondences.
Mappings Ψui : X˜ → IRL×{i}, i ∈ N are defined by fragments of the gradient
vectors of agents’ utility functions related to their own consumption:
(Ψui )j(x) =
∂ui
∂xij
(x), j ∈ L.
Mappings ΨFi , i ∈ N reflect a condition that a δ-equilibrium allocation belongs
to the face F =
∏
i∈N
Fi. Remind that we consider only xi ∈ ri Fi. We replace
here this condition with the milder requirement xi ∈ span Fi. Choose vectors
cit ∈ IRl such that xi ∈ span Fi iff xi is a solution of a system of t(i) linear
equations
citx
i = 0, t ∈ Ti, Ti = {1, . . . , t(i)}, (19)
and suppose that all rows of a matrix
Ci =
 c
i
1
...
cit(i)

are linearly independent for each i ∈ N. A mapping ΨFi : X˜ → IRTi is defined
by
ΨFi (x) = Cix
i.
Thus, the condition ΨFi (x) = 0 is necessary for x
i to belong to ri Fi.
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Let N1, . . . , Nk be an arbitrary partition of the set N. A mapping Ψm : X˜ ×
Θm → IRNm\{i0} responds to the budget restriction qmxi = 0 for i ∈ Nm :
(Ψm(x, qm))i = qmxi, i ∈ Nm\{i0}, m = 1, . . . , k.
For technical reasons, the budget restriction for agent i0 is removed. This re-
striction follows from those of other individuals and feasibility of an equilibrium
allocation.
A mapping Ψmc : X˜ → IRL×{n+1} represents the equilibrium market clearing
condition:
(Ψmc(x))j =
∑
i∈N
xij , j ∈ L.
Finally, we need the identity mapping Ψq : Θ→ Θ,
Ψq(q1, . . . , qk) = (q1, . . . , qk).
A mapping Ψu is defined as a product of the correspondences described above:
Ψu =
∏
i∈N
Ψui ×Ψmc ×
∏
i∈N
ΨFi ×
k∏
m=1
Ψm ×Ψq.
This mapping has domain Z = X˜×Θ and takes its values in a finite-dimensional
space IRT ×Θ, where
T =
(
n+1⋃
i=1
L× {i}
)
∪ (N\{i0}) ∪
(⋃
i∈N
Ti
)
.
A mapping Ψ : U × Z → IRT ×Θ is defined by
Ψ(u, z) = Ψu(z).
At the next step, we describe a submanifold ∆F such that for each proper δ-
equilibrium (x, q1, . . . , qk) its value Ψu(x, q1, . . . , qk) belongs to ∆F for some
choice of parameters i0,Θ, N1, . . . , Nk.
Partition the set Nm into two subsets N ′m and N
′′
m, where N
′
m consists of those
agents for whom the last budget restriction is binding and N ′′m contains those
agents who are locally satiated on the face Fi. The necessary first-order condi-
tions of a local extremum for the agents of the first type can be formulated as
follows: there exist y ∈ IRTi and λm ∈ IR++ such that
Ψui (x) =
∂ui
∂xi
(x) = λmqm + yCi.
For agents of the second type those conditions have a simpler form: there exists
y ∈ IRTi such that
Ψui (x) =
∂ui
∂xi
(x) = yCi.
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When defining a manifold ∆F , we take into consideration that Ψmi (x, q) is equal
to zero at equilibrium for agents from N ′m whenever m < k, or to µδi if m = k;
and corresponds to a free variable for i ∈ N ′′m, m = 1, . . . , k.
Define a submanifold ∆F ⊂ IRT ×Θ as follows:
∆F
def
=
{
(ν1, . . . , νn, β1, . . . , βk, σ, q, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) ∈ IRT ×Θ |
νi =
{
λmi qm + yCi, y ∈ IRTi , if i ∈ N ′m, m = 1, . . . , k,
yCi, y ∈ IRTi , if i ∈ N ′′m, m = 1, . . . , k,
(20)
(βm)i =
{
0 if i ∈ N ′m\{i0}, m = 1, . . . , k − 1,
δiµ if i ∈ N ′k\{i0}, m = k,
(21)
ϕi = 0, i ∈ N, σ = 0, ‖qm‖ = 1, m = 1, . . . , k
}
.
Here µ, λmi , and y are free variables;
νi is an l-dimensional vector that corresponds to a fragment of agent i’s gradient
of utility function related to his own consumption, i ∈ N ;
βm ∈ IRNm\{i0}, m = 1, . . . , k correspond to the budget restrictions;
σ ∈ IRl reflects the market clearing condition;
(q1, . . . , qk) ∈ Θ corresponds to a hierarchic price representing non-standard
equilibrium prices p;
ϕi ∈ IRTi relates to the condition xi ∈ F i.
Equations (20) are necessary conditions for the utility maximization problem
under the restrictions imposed by the face F and the budget.
We present now a summary of results from Abraham and Robbin (1967) that
will be used in the proof of the theorem.
Definition 5.5 (Transversality)
Let X and Y be C1 manifolds, f : X → Y a C1 map andW ⊆ Y a submanifold.
We say that f is transversal to W at a point x ∈ X (denoted by f tx W ), if,
where y = f(x), either y 6∈W or y ∈W and
(1) the image Txf(TxX) contains a closed complement to TyW in TyY, and
(2) the inverse image (Txf)−1(TyW ) splits (has a closed complement to TxX).
We say that f is transversal to W (in symbols f t W ) if f tx W for every
x ∈ X.
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Let V, X, Y be Cr manifolds, Cr(X,Y ) the set of Cr maps from X to Y and
ρ : V → Cr(X,Y ) a map. For v ∈ V we write ρv instead of ρ(v); i.e., ρv :
X → Y is a Cr map. We say ρ is a Cr representation if the evaluation map
ωρ : V × X → Y given as ωρ(v, x) = ρv(x) for v ∈ V and x ∈ X is a Cr map
from V ×X to Y.
Theorem 5.6 (Transversal Density Theorem)
Let V, X, Y be Cr manifolds, ρ : V → Cr(X,Y ) a Cr representation, W ⊆ Y a
submanifold (not necessarily closed), and ωρ : V ×X → Y the evaluation map.
Assume that
1. X has finite dimension n and W has finite codimension m;
2. V and X are second countable2;
3. r > max {n−m, 0};
4. ωρ tW .
Then a set VW = {v ∈ V | ρv tW} is residual (and hence dence) in V.
Theorem 5.7 (Openness of Transversal Intersection)
Let V, X, Y be Cr manifolds, ρ : V → C1(X,Y ) a C1 representation, W ⊆ Y a
C1 submanifold, K ⊆ X a compact subset, and
1. X is of finite dimension;
2. W is closed.
Then VKW = {v ∈ V | ρv tx W, x ∈ K} is open in V.
Denote by Li the linear hull of vectors {cit}, t ∈ Ti that constitute the rows of
the matrix Ci.
Lemma 5.8
Consider an element (u0, z0) = (u0, x0, q01 , . . . , q
0
k) ∈ U × Z such that
q0m 6∈ Li, i ∈ Nm , m = 1, . . . , k. (22)
Then Ψ : U × Z → IRT × Θ is transversal at (u0, z0) to any submanifold of
IRT ×Θ.
2second countable means having a topology with a countable basis of open sets.
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Proof. It is sufficient to show that the tangent correspondence T(u0,z0)Ψ is
surjective. Let υ = (υ1, .., υn, υ′1, .., υ
′
k, υ
′′, υ′′′, υ1, .., υn) ∈ IRT ×Θ. We need to
find a differentiable path (u(τ), z(τ))τ∈[0,1] such that
u(0) = u0, z(0) = z0 = (x0, q01 , .., q
0
k),
∂
∂τ
Ψ(u(τ), z(τ))|τ=0 = υ.
Components x(τ), qm(τ),m = 1, . . . , k of a path z(τ) can be found in the fol-
lowing form:
x(τ) = x0 + x¯τ, qm(τ) = q0m + q¯mτ, m = 1, . . . , k, (23)
where (x¯, q¯1, . . . , q¯k) are determined from the system of linear equations

(
∑
i∈N x
i(τ))′|τ=0 = υ′′,
(xi(τ), qm(τ))′|τ=0 = υ′mi, i ∈ Nm\{i0}, m = 1, . . . , k,
(Cixi(τ))′|τ=0 = υi, i ∈ N,
(qm(τ))′|τ=0 = υ′′′m, m = 1, . . . , k.
Substituting representation (23) into this system and taking the first derivatives
at τ = 0 gives

∑
i∈N x¯
i = υ′′,
(x¯i, q0m) = υ
′
mi − (xi0, q¯m), i ∈ Nm\{i0}, m = 1, . . . , k,
Cix¯
i = υi, i ∈ N,
q¯m = υ′′′m, m = 1, . . . , k.
Elements q¯1, . . . , q¯k can be found from the last kl equations. Take as x¯ any
solution of a system

∑
i∈N x¯
i = υ′′,
(x¯i, q0m) = υ˜mi, i ∈ Nm\{i0}, m = 1, . . . , k,
Cix¯
i = υi, i ∈ N,
(24)
where υ˜mi = υ′mi − (xi0, q¯m). By the conditions of the lemma, all rows of the
matrix D of this system (see Fig. 3) are linearly independent, hence a solution
exists.
Let us determine a path u(τ) assuming ui(τ, x) = u0(x) + bixiτ, where vectors
bi ∈ IRl are chosen to satisfy
∂
∂τ
( ∂ui
∂xij
(x(τ))
)∣∣∣
τ=0
= υij . (25)
Since x(τ) = x0 + x¯τ, the equation (25) transforms to
bij = υij −
∑
s∈N×L
∂2(u0)i
∂xij∂xs
(x0)x¯s.
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D =

E E · · · E · · · E · · · E
0 q01
...
. . .
q01
. . .
q0k
. . .
q0k
Ci
. . .
Ci
. . .
Ci
...
. . .
0 Ci

Figure 3: The matrix of the system (24). E is an (l × l) identity matrix. The
first l columns of the matrix D correspond to the consumption of agent i0.
Since the vector υ has been chosen arbitrarily, we have shown that the deriva-
tive mapping T(u0,z0)Ψ is surjective. To complete the proof, we need to establish
that (T(u0,z0)Ψ)
−1(TyW ) splits. This follows from the surjectivity of T(u0,z0)Ψ
and from the finite dimensionality of its range.
2
Linear dependence of the rows of a matrix
(
qm
Ci
)
or, which is the same, the
condition
qm ∈ Li, i ∈ Nm (26)
implies that the budget restriction qmxi = 0 follows from the condition that
the consumption plan xi belongs to the face Fi. We are going now to remove
the budget restrictions for agents from some set H ⊆ N, delete corresponding
components (Ψm)i of the mapping Ψ and accordingly restrict the domain of Ψ
in the part concerning prices. The modified mapping ΨH will be transversal to
any submanifold W ⊆ IRl ×Θ at any point (u, x, q1, . . . , qk) ∈ U × X˜ ×ΘH —
the domain of ΨH .
Namely, let ΘH be a set of all elements (q1, . . . , qk) in Θ such that qm ∈ Li only
for i ∈ H ∩Nm. Denote H ∩Nm by Hm and consider sets
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WHm =
{
(
⋂
i∈Hm Li)\(
⋃
i∈Nm\Hm Li), if Hm 6= ∅ ,
IRl\(⋃i∈Nm Li) otherwise. (27)
Take sets
ΘHm = Θ
m ∩WHm , m = 1, . . . , k
as components of the manifold ΘH :
ΘH = ΘH1 × · · · ×ΘHk .
Notice that sets ΘH , H ⊆ N are relatively open and form a partition of the
manifold Θ.
Let T¯ = T\H and consider the mapping
ΨHu =
∏
i∈N
Ψui ×Ψmc ×
∏
i∈N
ΨFi ×
k∏
m=1
ΨmH ×ΨqH : X˜ ×ΘH → IRT¯ × cl ΘH ,
where the mappings ΨmH : X˜ ×ΘHm → IRNm\(Hm∪{i0}) are defined by
(ΨmH(x, qm))i = qmx
i, i ∈ Nm\(Hm ∪ {i0}), m = 1, . . . , k,
and ΨqH(q1, . . . , qk) = (q1, . . . , qk) is an identity embedding from Θ
H to cl ΘH .
All other mappings are defined as before. Put ΨH(u, z) = ΨHu (z). The manifold
∆HF is the analogue of the manifold ∆F :
∆HF
def
=
{
(ν1, . . . , νn, β1, . . . , βk, σ, q, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) ∈ IRT¯ × cl ΘH |
νi =
{
λmi qm + yCi, y ∈ IRTi if i ∈ N ′m\Hm, m = 1, . . . , k,
yCi, y ∈ IRTi otherwise, (28)
(βm)i =
{
0 if i ∈ N ′m\(Hm ∪ {i0}), m = 1, . . . , k − 1,
δiµ if i ∈ N ′k\(Hk ∪ {i0}), m = k,
(29)
ϕi = 0, i ∈ N, σ = 0, ‖qm‖ = 1, m = 1, . . . , k
}
.
Lemma 5.9
Suppose that u ∈ U is such that for every H ⊆ N, Θ, every partition (N1, . . . , Nk)
of the set N, and for all possible choices of subsets of satiated agents N ′′1 , . . . , N
′′
k ,
the mapping ΨHu is transversal to the manifold ∆HF . Then the number of proper
δ-equilibria that belong to the face F is finite.
Proof. The finiteness of proper δ-equilibria follows from the finiteness (with
respect to a choice of parameters Θ, N1, . . . , Nk, N ′′1 , . . . , N
′′
k , and H ⊆ N) of
the possibly different arrangements of the correspondence ΨHu and the manifold
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∆HF , as well as from the discreteness of the inverse images (ΨHu )
−1(∆HF ),
whose union covers all proper δ-equilibria from F. Therefore, it will suffice to
establish finiteness of the sets (ΨHu )
−1(∆HF ) to prove the lemma. By a well-
known property of transversal correspondences,
codim ∆HF = codim (ΨHu )
−1(∆HF ). (30)
We show that
codim ∆HF ≥ dim X˜ ×ΘH = nl + dim ΘH . (31)
Consider first only such equilibria that N1 = N ′1 (i. e., there is no satiation in
the usual sense). By the construction and the assumptions made, codim ∆HF
is equal to the difference between a number of restrictions and a number of free
variables. Each restriction of type (29) or ϕi = 0, i ∈ N corresponds to the
free variable λ or y, respectively. The budget restriction q1xi0 = 0 is omitted
(i0 necessarily belongs to the set N1). Taking into account relations (28), σ = 0,
‖qm‖ = 1, m = 1, . . . , k, and a free variable µ, one gets
codim ∆HF = nl + l + k − 2.
Since dim ΘH ≤ l
codim ∆HF ≥ nl + dim ΘH (32)
if k > 1. Note, that codim ∆HF does not depend on the choice of H. If k = 1
then N = N1, so we can put the free variable µ equal to zero (there are no
satiated agents). This increases the codimension of the manifold by 1, and (32)
is established again. In the case N ′′1 6= ∅ we proceed in the same way with the
only difference that µ is not equated to zero but expressed through the values
of the budget correspondences of the satiated agents.
By transversality of ΨHu and relative openness of Θ
H
m in ∩i∈HmLi, we conclude
that
dim (ΨHu )
−1(∆HF ) < 0, if dim ΘH 6= l;
dim (ΨHu )
−1(∆HF ) = 0, if dim ΘH = l.
Thus, (ΨHu )
−1(∆HF ) is discrete whenever dim ΘH = l, k ≤ 2 or is empty
otherwise. One can easily see that there is only one subset H¯ ⊆ N such that
dim ΘH¯ = l.
Since ∆F is closed, and X is, without the loss of generality, compact in IRln,
the intersection (Ψu)−1(∆F ) ∩ (X × Θ) is compact in IRln × Θ. We have the
following relation
(Ψu)−1(∆F ) ⊆
⋃
H
(ΨHu )
−1(∆HF ) = (ΨH¯u )
−1(∆H¯F ).
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But (ΨH¯u )
−1(∆H¯F ) is discrete in X˜ ×ΘH . Therefore, (Ψu)−1(∆F )∩ (X × S) is
a discrete compact, which implies the finiteness of proper δ-equilibria from F.
2
Proof of Theorem 5.4. For each i ∈ N choose a compact Ki ∈ IRL×{i} such
that int Ki ⊃ Xi,K =
∏
i∈N
Ki ⊂ X˜, and let {SHt }∞t=1 be a sequence of compact
sets approximating ΘH from within:
1. SHt ⊂ ΘH , t = 1, 2 . . . ,
2.
∞⋃
t=1
SHt = ΘH .
Consider a sequence of compact sets KtH = K ×SHt ⊂ X˜ ×ΘH , t = 1, 2..., and
apply the theorems of density and openness of transversal sections to the case
V = U, X = X˜ × ΘH , Y = IRT¯ × cl ΘH , ρv = ΨHu , ωρ = ΨH , W = ∆HF .
By construction, ΨH is transversal to ∆HF , and all other conditions of Thom’s
theorems are satisfied as well. Therefore, the set VtKW = {u ∈ U | ΨHu tz
∆HF , z ∈ KtH} is open and dense in U. Let
G =
∞⋂
t=1
VtKW ,
where the intersection is taken over t = 1, 2... and over all admissible F, ΘH ,
H, N ′1..., N
′
k, i0. Since G is a countable intersection of open dense sets, it is
residual. Direct application of Lemma 5.9 completes the proof.
2
6 Hierarchic equilibria and
constrained equilibria
Another interesting generic property of a δ-equilibrium is that unless it is a
Walrasian equilibrium, it has to be a coupons equilibrium. Coupons equilib-
rium introduced in Dre`ze and Mu¨ller (1980) is a normative concept for a model
with price rigidities and rationing. At such an equilibrium, each agent is given
an element of his budget set such that the coupon value of his net trade is smaller
than his coupon endowment. Formally, an allocation x ∈ X is a coupons equi-
librium if there exist p ∈ Q, a ∈ {v ∈ IRl|v1 = 0}, and (ci)i∈N ∈ IRN+ such that
i)
∑
i∈N x
i =
∑
i∈N w
i; ii) pxi = pwi and axi ≤ ci + awi for every i ∈ N ; and
iii) xi maximizes ith utility over all consumption bundles that satisfy ii). The
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first commodity is chosen as the numeraire, it is never rationed at a coupons
equilibrium. Furthermore, we assume
A3. Commodity 1 is strictly desirable and Xi + ce1 ⊆ Xi for every i ∈ N ,
c ∈ IR+, where e1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0).
Theorem 6.1
Suppose that an economy satisfies assumptions A1–A3. Then, for any strictly
positive vector δ, there exists a residual set G′ ⊆ U such that for each u ∈ G′
the following condition is true: every proper δ-equilibrium is either a Walrasian
equilibrium, or a coupons equilibrium.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 5.4. The result follows from
the fact that (ΨHu )
−1(∆HF ) is non-empty only if the number of components in
Θ is less than or equal to two. Therefore, there exists a residual set G′ such
that for every u ∈ G′ each δ-equilibrium is sustained by a hierarchic price with
k ≤ 2.
Assumption A3 implies local non-satiation. It follows then by Theorem 2.6
that ◦ε = 0 (we assume without loss of generality that λ1 is near-standard). If
k = 1 then it follows from Proposition 3.6 that each δ-equilibrium is a Walrasian
equilibrium sustained by prices q1. Suppose that x is a δ-equilibrium and (q1, q2)
is a hierarchic representation of non-standard equilibrium prices. By local non-
satiation, q1xi = q1wi for every i ∈ N. Take q1 as “money prices”. Note that
(q1)1 > 0. Denote by q˜1 and q˜2 the projections of hierarchic components on
the last l − 1 coordinates. For any yi ∈ {zi ∈ Xi|q1zi = q1wi} the condition
q2y
i ≤ q2wi + µi is equivalent to(
q˜2 − (q2)1(q1)1 q˜1
)
yi ≤
(
q˜2 − (q2)1(q1)1 q˜1
)
wi + µi.
Therefore, we can take a = q˜2 − ((q2)1/(q1)1)q˜1 as a vector of coupon prices,
and put ci = µi = ◦(εδi/λ2) if the second budget constraint plays any role.
Otherwise, we can take ci big enough so that ayi ≤ awi + ci is satisfied for any
yi ∈ {zi ∈ Xi|q1zi = q1wi}. Thus we have proved that x is a coupons equilib-
rium sustained by “money prices” q1, coupon prices a and coupon endowments
(ci)i∈N .
2
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7 Optimality and core equivalence
Marakulin (1990) has shown that each non-standard dividend equilibrium is
weakly Pareto optimal and, conversely, that each weakly Pareto optimal alloca-
tion can be decentralized with an appropriate non-standard price vector. For an
economy with polyhedral consumption sets, Proposition 3.9 implies that such
an allocation (sometimes called a Pareto equilibrium) is a non-standard equilib-
rium after some appropriate redistribution of initial endowments, so the second
welfare theorem holds. Whether a Pareto equilibrium is always a non-standard
equilibrium for an economy with consumption sets that are not necessarily poly-
hedral is still an open question.
Florig (2001) has proved that the set of hierarchic equilibria coincides with the
fuzzy rejective core of an economy. The latter concept is a refinement of the weak
core introduced first in Konovalov (1998). It follows from Theorem 3.8 that the
set of non-standard dividend equilibria coincides with the fuzzy rejective core
as well. In this section we will show how this result can be proved directly by
use of the non-standard separation argument.
We say that a coalition S ⊆ N rejects a feasible allocation x¯ if there exist
a partition of S consisting of two subcoalitions S1, S2 ⊆ S and consumption
bundles yi ∈ Xi, i ∈ S, such that∑
i∈S
yi =
∑
i∈S1
x¯i +
∑
i∈S2
wi,
and yi ∈ Pi(x¯i), i ∈ S. Rejecting can be viewed as performed in three steps.
First, each member i of S receives an offer x¯i. Second, a subcoalition S1 of
agents who accept an offer is formed. At the third stage, trade within coalition
S occurs. If it is possible to make all agents in S better off, then x¯ is said to be
rejected by the coalition S.
It is clear that rejection implies strong blocking in a usual sense. For this reason,
the rejective core — the set of all feasible allocation that are not rejected by
any coalition — is usually a proper subset of the weak core3.
A fuzzy coalition ξ ∈ [0, 1]N\{0} rejects an allocation x¯ ∈ X, if there exist fuzzy
coalitions t and s with t + s = ξ and consumption plans yi ∈ Xi, yi ∈ Pi(x¯i)
for all i ∈ supp ξ, such that∑
i∈N
ξiy
i =
∑
i∈N
tix¯
i +
∑
i∈N
siw
i.
The set of all feasible allocations that cannot be rejected by any fuzzy coalition
is called the fuzzy rejective core of an economy E and is denoted by Cfr(E).
3For economies with satiation, the concept of weak blocking lead to the core which is
usually empty, see Aumann and Dre`ze (1986).
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The interpretation of fuzzy coalitions and fuzzy rejection can be as follows.
Each fuzzy coalition ξ can be viewed as a coalition in E[0,1], a [0, 1]-replica of the
initial economy E . In E[0,1] every agent i is replaced by a continuum of agents
identical to i, each set of agents of same type is of Lebesgue measure 1. The
number ξi represents the measure of the set of agents of type i participating in
the coalition ξ. Suppose that an allocation x¯ is chosen as a solution by a social
planner or by the society as a whole. Furthermore, suppose that it takes time
to pass on from the initial allocation w to x¯, and at some point only a fraction
α ∈ (0, 1) of the society has managed to get the prescribed consumption plans.
Denote this coalition by S1 (S1 corresponds to a fuzzy coalition (α, . . . , α)).
Recall that by feasibility of x¯ ∑
i∈N
αx¯i =
∑
i∈N
αwi.
Meanwhile, the complementary coalition S2 represented by the fuzzy coalition
(1−α, . . . , 1−α) keeps the initial endowments. At this moment, some members
of S1 and S2 can get involved in a mutually beneficial4 trade. Specifically, take
some β ≤ min{α, 1 − α}. A fuzzy coalition βξ can provide the consumption
bundle yi for every its member of type i :∑
i∈N
βξiy
i =
∑
i∈N
βtix¯
i +
∑
i∈N
βsiw
i.
Here βti ≤ α, βsi ≤ 1 − α for every i ∈ supp ξ. In short, if reallocation of
resources requires time, then x¯ is unstable against possibility of recontracting.
This is the meaning of fuzzy rejection.
Denote the set of non-standard dividend equilibria of an economy E by Wns(E).
Theorem 7.1
Assume that all consumption sets Xi are polyhedral, and that the sets Pi(xi)
are open, convex and do not contain xi for all xi ∈ Xi, i ∈ N. Then the fuzzy
rejective core of an economy E coincides with the set of non-standard dividend
equilibria:
Cfr(E) =Wns(E).
Proof. First, we show that
Cfr(E) ⊆Wns(E).
Let x¯ = (x¯i)i∈N ∈ Cfr(E) and consider the sets
Gi(x¯i) = {yi − x¯i|yi ∈ Pi(x¯i)}, i ∈ N,
4Strictly speaking, we need x¯i to be individually rational and preference order transitive
for a trade to be beneficial for an agent i who kept his initial endowments.
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and
Gi(wi) = {yi − wi|yi ∈ Pi(x¯i)}, i ∈ N.
Denote the convex hull of the union of these sets by G
G = conv
⋃
i∈N
(Gi(x¯i) ∪ Gi(wi))
and show that G does not contain zero. Suppose it does. Then, by convexity of
Gi(x¯i) and Gi(wi), there exist t = (ti)i∈N , s = (si)i∈N , y, z ∈ X such that∑
i∈N
ti +
∑
i∈N
si = 1, ti, si ≥ 0, i ∈ N,
∑
i∈N
tiy
i +
∑
i∈N
siz
i =
∑
i∈N
tix¯
i +
∑
i∈N
siw
i, (33)
where yi ∈ Pi(x¯i) if i ∈ supp t, and zi ∈ Pi(x¯i) if i ∈ supp s. This implies that
x¯ is rejected by a fuzzy coalition t+ s, a contradiction. Therefore, a zero point
does not belong to the convex set G. By the non-standard separating hyperplane
theorem (see Konovalov (2001), Theorem 2.9.3), there exists p ∈ ∗IRl such that
for every yi ∈ Pi(x¯i), i ∈ N, the following conditions hold simultaneously
pyi > pwi, (34)
and
pyi > px¯i. (35)
Define the components of the vector d ∈ ∗IRn+ by
di = max {0, px¯i − pwi}, i ∈ N. (36)
Then px¯i ≤ pwi + di, i ∈ N, which implies attainability of x¯. To prove the
validity of the required inclusion we have to show that x¯ satisfies the equilibrium
property of individual rationality:
B¯i(p, di) ∩ Pi(x¯i) = ∅. (37)
What we do have so far is
{x ∈ ∗Xi : px ≤ pwi + di} ∩ Pi(x¯i) = ∅, i ∈ N.
But then (37) is a consequence of Proposition 3.9 and openness of the sets
Pi(x¯i), i ∈ N.
To prove the converse inclusion Wns(E) ⊆ Cfr(E), let x¯ ∈ Wns(E) and assume
that p ∈ ∗IRl and d ∈ ∗IRn+ are corresponding non-standard equilibrium prices
and dividends. Suppose that there exists a fuzzy coalition ξ = (ξi)i∈N that
blocks x¯. Then, there exist yi ∈ Pi(x¯i) , ti, si ∈ IR+, i ∈ supp ξ such that∑
i∈N
tiy
i +
∑
i∈N
siy
i =
∑
i∈N
tix¯
i +
∑
i∈N
siw
i, (38)
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where ti + si = ξi. By individual rationality,
yi 6∈ B¯i(p, di), i ∈ supp ξ, (39)
which implies that
pyi > pwi, i ∈ supp ξ.
Fix i ∈ supp ξ and consider a hierarchic representation (q1, . . . , qk) of prices p.
For every yi find a number h = h(i) ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that
qhy
i > qhw
i, qry
i = qrwi, r < h.
We claim that
qhy
i > qhx¯
i, i ∈ supp ξ. (40)
To prove it, use the characterization of the budget set B¯i(p, di) given by Propo-
sition 3.6. Since yi 6∈ B¯i(p, di), there exists m = m(i) ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that at
least one of the conditions
q1y
i = q1wi,
...
qm−1yi = qm−1wi,
(qmyi ≤ qmwi + µi) ∨ (qmyi ≤ qmwi),
where µi = ◦(di/λj(p,di)), is violated, so it must be h ≤ m. Taking into account
x¯i ∈ B¯i(p, di) one obtains qhyi > qhx¯i. Moreover, it is easy to see that qrx¯i =
qrw
i = qryi for all r < h. Define
h¯ = min
i∈supp ξ
h(i).
Then for every i ∈ supp ξ
qh¯y
i ≥ qh¯wi, (41)
qh¯y
i ≥ qh¯x¯i, (42)
and there exists i ∈ supp ξ such that both inequalities are strict. Multiplying
(41) and (42) by si and ti respectively, and summing over all i gets
(qh¯,
∑
i∈N
tiy
i) + (qh¯,
∑
i∈N
siy
i) > (qh¯,
∑
i∈N
tix¯
i) + (qh¯,
∑
i∈N
siw
i),
which contradicts (38). Consequently, the inclusion Wns(E) ⊆ Cfr(E) is true
and this completes the proof of the theorem.
2
Konovalov (1998) has shown by standard mathematical methods that the set of
dividend equilibria is equivalent to the fuzzy rejective core of an economy if the
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survival assumption is met for every agent. As we know, non-standard dividend
equilibria become dividend equilibria in this case. Thus Theorem 7.1 provides a
generalization of Konovalov’s equivalence theorem to the case where the survival
assumption may fail. It is easy to check that in Gale’s (1976) example no
dividend equilibria exist, while there is a whole continuum of fuzzy rejective
core allocations. However, it is possible to restore the core equivalence once
dividend equilibria with non-standard prices are brought into consideration.
8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.4. It is sufficient to show that Bi(p¯) = B¯i(p) for
every i ∈ N. For a fixed i, assume x ∈ B¯i(p) and let (q1, . . . , qk) be a hierarchic
representation of the price vector p. Note that p¯ = ◦(p/‖p‖) = q1. There exists
x˜ ∈ ∗Xi such that px˜ ≤ pwi and x˜ ≈ x. Assume inequality q1x > q1wi. Then
q1x˜+
λ2
λ1
q2x˜+ · · ·+ λk
λ1
qkx˜ > q1w
i +
λ2
λ1
q2w
i + · · ·+ λk
λ1
qkw
i,
which yields a contradiction with px˜ ≤ pwi. Therefore q1x ≤ q1wi and x ∈ Bi(p¯).
Let x ∈ Bi(p¯) and find y ∈ Bi(p¯) such that p¯y < p¯wi. Consider an inter-
nal sequence α : ∗IN → ∗Xi defined by α(n) = (1/n)y + (1 − 1/n)x. Since
pα(n) < pwi for all n ∈ IN, it should be also true for some hyperfinite natural
number n˜ ∈ ∗IN\IN. Then α(n˜) ≈ x, which implies x ∈ st ∗Bi(p) = B¯i(p).
We have shown that Bi(p¯) = B¯i(p) for each i ∈ N. Hence x¯ is a Walrasian
equilibrium with equilibrium prices p¯.
2
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